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Abstract---Any on-demand pseudonym acquisition strategy is
problematic should the connectivity to the credential manage-
ment infrastructure be intermittent. If a vehicle runs out of
pseudonyms with no connectivity to refill its pseudonym pool,
one solution is the on-the-fly generation of pseudonyms, e.g.,
leveraging anonymous authentication. However, such a vehicle
would stand out in the crowd: one can simply distinguish
pseudonyms, thus signed messages, based on the pseudonym
issuer signature, link them and track the vehicle. To address this
challenge, we propose a randomized hybrid scheme, RHyTHM,
to enable vehicles to remain operational when disconnected
without compromising privacy: vehicles with valid pseudonyms
help others to enhance their privacy by randomly joining them
in using on-the-fly self-certified pseudonyms along with aligned
lifetimes. This way, the privacy of disconnected users is enhanced
with a reasonable computational overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Vehicular Communication (VC) systems, vehicles beacon
Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) and Decentralized
Environmental Notification Messages (DENMs) periodically
at a high rate in order to provide cooperative awareness.
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)
(V2X) communication is protected with the help of public key
cryptography: a set of short-term anonymous credentials, i.e.,
pseudonyms, are provided to each vehicle by the Vehicular
Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI), e.g., [1]. Thus, vehicles
switch from one pseudonym to another for message unlink-
ability as pseudonyms are inherently unlinkable.
One can provide vehicles with valid pseudonyms for a long
period, e.g., 25 years [2]. However, extensive preloading with
millions of pseudonyms per vehicle for such a long period
is computationally costly, inefficient in utilization and cum-
bersome in revocation [3]. On the contrary, several proposals
suggest more frequent Vehicle-to-VPKI interactions, namely
on-demand schemes, e.g., [1], [4]. This strategy is more
efficient in terms of pseudonym utilization and revocation and
more effective in fending off misbehavior. However, the more
frequent the interaction with the VPKI, the more dependent
vehicles are on connectivity. This may hurt Vehicle-to-VPKI
connectivity on intermittent coverage of sparsely-deployed
Roadside Units (RSUs), or highly overloaded existing cellular
infrastructure. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that any vehicle
at any time can continue its operation securely without harm-
ing privacy, even if the VPKI is not reachable or available for
other reasons, e.g., during a Denial of Service (DoS) attack [1].
Obviously, signing CAMs with the private keys correspond-
ing to expired pseudonyms or the long-term certificate, is
insecure and harm user privacy, i.e., messages are trivially
linkable. On-the-fly generation of pseudonyms, the hybrid
scheme [5], using other anonymous authentication primitives,
i.e., group signatures [6], is a promising alternative. Each
vehicle is equipped with a group public key, common among
all the group members, along with a distinct group signing
key. In order to generate on-the-fly pseudonyms, each vehicle
generates a pair of public/private keys and signs the public key
using the group signing key instead of having a pseudonym
signed by the corresponding Certification Authority (CA). This
essentially eliminates the need to request pseudonyms from
the VPKI entities, especially when the latter is unreachable.
This provides authenticity, integrity, accountability, and non-
repudiation. Furthermore, a node can be evicted from the
system if it deviated from the system security policy.
If only a few vehicles use their self-certified pseudonyms
while the rest of the vehicles rely on the VPKI-provided
pseudonyms, the baseline scheme, they would ‘‘stand out in a
crowd’’: one can simply distinguish the pseudonyms, thus the
pseudonymously signed messages, based on the pseudonym
issuer’s signature. Moreover, the self-certified pseudonyms
lifetimes are not aligned with each other and the global system
time, i.e., the VPKI clock. As a result, all the vehicles in
a region will be transmitting under pseudonyms which are
distinguishable based on their timing information [1].
To address this challenge, we propose a cooperative and
adaptive scheme, RHyTHM, to mitigate this privacy issue:
a vehicle with no valid VPKI-provided pseudonyms initiates
RHyTHM protocol by setting a flag in the upcoming CAMs.
Neighboring vehicles with VPKI-provided pseudonyms ran-
domly opt in to utilize their self-certified pseudonyms with the
probability of r in upcoming pseudonym updates. RHyTHM
enhances the privacy of users running out of pseudonyms at
the cost of reasonable processing overhead for neighboring
vehicles. This ensures the operation of every legitimate vehicle
without harming user privacy even if the infrastructure fails
to provide them credentials.
In the rest of the paper, we describe our system and adversar-
ial model (Sec. II), present our scheme (Sec. III) and security
and privacy analysis (Sec. IV). We provide the performance
evaluation of our scheme (Sec. V) before conclusion (Sec. VI).
II. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARIAL MODEL
We assume a VPKI with distinct entities and roles [1]: the
Long Term CA (LTCA) is responsible for vehicles registration
in a domain [3]; the Pseudonym CA (PCA) issues pseudonyms
for the registered vehicles; and the Resolution Authority (RA)
is able to initiate a process to resolve a pseudonym of a
misbehaving vehicle. Furthermore, a Group Manager (GM)
enables any legitimate vehicle to sign a message on behalf
of the group without disclosing its actual identity. Upon
registration of a vehicle by the LTCA in the bootstrapping
phase, each vehicle is provided with an anonymous ticket,
with which the GM registers the vehicle, thus authorizes it to
anonymously operate in some circumstances, e.g., the VPKI
is unreachable.
We consider external and internal adversaries that try to
harm or abuse RHyTHM. External adversaries could sign
messages with fake private keys. Internal adversaries could
initiate RHyTHM protocol continuously for two purposes: (i)
to be provided with multiple simultaneously valid pseudonyms,
thus performing Sybil-based [7] attacks; (ii) to compromise
the availability of neighboring vehicles by incurring extra
workload towards DoS attacks. Moreover, a global observer,
e.g., an honest-but-curious VPKI entity [1], might be tempted
to link the VPKI-provided pseudonyms to the self-certified
ones to infer user sensitive information towards harming user
privacy.
III. RHYTHM OPERATION
In order to achieve full unlinkability, we assume that a
universally fixed interval, Γ, is specified in a region [3] and
all pseudonyms in that region are issued with the lifetime
aligned with the global system time, i.e., the VPKI clock.
As a result of this policy, at any point in time, all the
vehicles transmit using pseudonyms indistinguishable, from
one another, thanks to this time alignment. This essentially
eliminates any distinction among pseudonym sets of different
vehicles, thus achieving user privacy protection. We refer
readers to [1] for further details. The On-Board Unit (OBU)
‘‘decides’’ when to trigger the pseudonym acquisition process
based on various parameters [8]. This can happen even within
the lifetime of the last single valid pseudonym should the
connectivity to the VPKI entities be reliable. However, if the
VPKI entities are out of reach for any reason, the OBU initiates
the RHyTHM protocol to use its self-certified pseudonyms
during the next pseudonym update. If the OBU has no valid
VPKI-provided pseudonyms, it initiates RHyTHM protocol
with its self-certified pseudonym. Table I summarizes notation
used in the protocol.
The vehicle, V , generates multiple Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) key pairs and aligns the valid-
ity intervals with the known VPKI clock (steps 1–7). The OBU
does not need to be fully synchronized with the VPKI clock;
it simply aligns the pseudonyms lifetimes, τP , in the contin-
uation of its last valid VPKI-provided pseudonym. In case of
having VPKI-provided pseudonyms from a distant past and
being unable to be synchronized by any other means, the OBU
aligns the self-certified pseudonyms based on the pseudonym
information, piggybacked in neighbors CAMs. This eliminates
any distinction among self-certified pseudonyms (signed by
TABLE I
NOTATION USED IN THE PROTOCOLS
(Kiv, k
i
v) pseudonymous public/private keys, corresponding to current pseudonym
gskv group signing key
tnow, ts, te fresh/current, starting, and ending timestamps
Sign(key,msg) signing a message with private key or group signing key
(msg)σv , (msg)Σgskv a signed message with k
i
v or gskv
RHyTHM Initiation Protocol
1: procedure RHYTHMINIT(ts , te)
2: for i:=1 to n do
3: Begin
4: Generate(Kiv , k
i
v)
5: ζ ← (Kiv , t
i
s, t
i
e)
6: (Kiv)Σkiv
← Sign(gskv , ζ)
7: End
8: Flagrhythm ← True
9: CAM ← {Fields, F lagrhythm , tnow}
10: (CAM)σ
kiv
← Sign(CAM,Kiv)
11: end procedure
VPKI-provided pseudonyms
Self-certified pseudonyms
V1
V4
V2
V3
V5 Processing time to generate 
a self-certified pseudonym
} } } }}
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Fig. 1. RHyTHM overview: if b = True, the vehicle will utilize its self-
certified pseudonym; otherwise, it relies on its VPKI-provided pseudonym.
the group signing key, gskv); moreover, the anonymity set
becomes equal to the number of vehicles with self-certified
pseudonyms. Finally, V signs them using the gskv. It then
piggybacks CAMs to explicitly inform its neighbors of initial-
izing the RHyTHM protocol for the next pseudonym update
(steps 8–10). Upon reception of a RHyTHM initiation query,
the neighboring vehicles check if the VPKI entities are indeed
out of reach. Having had the same viewpoint on the VPKI
reachability, they explicitly set the RHyTHM flag in the
upcoming CAMs to inform their neighbors, thus epidemically
distributing the message. This ensures the distribution of the
RHyTHM initiation query.
Fig. 1 illustrates five vehicles, out of which V5 runs out
of pseudonyms. It initiates the RHyTHM protocol by setting
the RHyTHM flag in the upcoming CAMs. Neighboring
vehicles, i.e., V1–V4, randomly opt in to utilize their self-
certified pseudonyms with probability r in the first pseudonym
update. V2 and V3 ‘‘decide’’ to switch to utilize their self-
certified pseudonyms, thus, they generate a pair of keys, align
the validity interval with the global system time, and sign
them with gsk. For the second pseudonym update in Γ, only
V3 ‘‘opted in’’ to use its VPKI-provided pseudonym while
the rest of vehicles ‘‘decided’’ to utilize their self-certified
pseudonyms. V5 is the only vehicle that uses its self-certified
pseudonyms during the entire Γ period while other vehicles
randomly opt in to use either of the two. As vehicles randomly
switch between the two sets, it is hard to link two pseudonyms
to the same vehicle, or identify a vehicle that uses solely
self-certified pseudonyms within a Γ period. Once access to
the VPKI entities is restored, V5 refills its pseudonym pool;
however, the user privacy is enhanced if it keeps switching
between the two sets. In other words, if a vehicle solely
relies on its VPKI-provided pseudonyms, the probability of
linking two successive pseudonyms, belonging to itself, will
be increased.
The exact threshold for how far to distribute the RHyTHM
initiation query depends on different factors, e.g., the number
of nearby VPKI-disconnected vehicles. The more vehicles
without valid VPKI-provided pseudonyms, the less is the
needed support from the rest of vehicles. Clearly, initiating the
RHyTHM protocol with a high probability of r to switch to
self-certified pseudonyms and assist few vehicles is inefficient:
it imposes extra overhead on the entire system. However, to
enhance the privacy of a few users, it is sufficient to receive
a small ‘‘contribution’’ from other vehicles (it becomes clear
later). Moreover, if the number of disconnected nodes without
valid pseudonyms is much higher than the number of nodes
with VPKI-provided pseudonyms, all the nodes ‘‘should’’
switch to self-certified pseudonyms, issued with aligned life-
times. Dynamically determining an optimal r remains as future
work.
IV. SECURITY & PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Non-repudiation, authentication and integrity: The
RHyTHM initiation is signed by a currently valid pseudonym,
thus we achieve authentication and integrity. Digital signatures
and pseudonyms ensure non-repudiation, thus, each entity can
be held accountable for its actions.
Thwarting Sybil-based misbehavior: An internal adver-
sary could be equipped with two valid pseudonyms when
RHyTHM is active. We rely on the Hardware Security Mod-
ule to ensure that all outgoing signatures are signed under
one private key of a single valid (VPKI- or self-certified)
pseudonym. To mitigate generation of multiple self-certified
pseudonyms, one can employ group signature schemes with
such a feature [5].
Revocation: If a vehicle deviates from the security policies,
it will be evicted from the system based on the underlying
VPKI operations. More precisely, the RA interacts with the
PCA, the GM, and the LTCA to resolve, and possibly revoke,
a misbehaving vehicle, thus, distributing the revocation list.
Thwarting clogging DoS attack: RHyTHM initiation flag,
integrated in CAMs, is epidemically broadcasted. Upon recep-
tion of a CAM with RHyTHM initiation request, if vehicles
can confirm a connection to the VPKI, they simply ignore it
(or choose a low value of r). Moreover, RHyTHM only lasts
while the VPKI entities are out of reach, i.e., vehicles switch
back to utilizing their VPKI-provided pseudonyms at the end
of Γ period (if there is no more RHyTHM initiation request).
Honest-but-curious VPKI entities: Due to the separa-
tion of duty, no single VPKI entity is able to fully de-
anonymize a user or link pseudonyms over a long period
of time. RHyTHM improves privacy protection for vehicles
with valid VPKI-provided pseudonyms that participate in
RHyTHM: pseudonyms used for secure communication are
partially linkable by the PCA and partially by the GM within a
Γ. Communication with self-certified pseudonyms for vehicles
without VPKI-provided ones is linkable by the GM.
Privacy: RHyTHM increases user privacy in compared to
the baseline scheme. We consider here a suitable privacy met-
ric: the probability of linking two (successive) pseudonyms be-
longing to the same vehicle. After each pseudonym changing
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(b) RHyTHM: 1% disconnected
Fig. 2. 1% of nodes run out of pseudonyms (τP = 60 sec, r = 0.5)
process, an observer might be tempted to link two pseudonyms
within a region at a specific time window. Note that the
RHyTHM initiation query is signed either by a VPKI-provided
or a self-certified pseudonym(s), belonging to the disconnected
node(s); thus, one can simply link that pseudonym(s) to the
self-certified ones. Fig. 2 shows the percentage of nodes
using their VPKI-provided or self-certified pseudonyms for
an actual mobility trace (www.vehicularlab.uni.lu/), during
the rush hour (7-7:30 am). Fig. 2.a illustrates that 1% of
nodes cannot access the VPKI to refill their pseudonyms
pool, e.g., due to sparse deployment of the RSUs. As a
result, there is a huge difference between their anonymity
set size, thus harming user privacy. We define the anonymity
set as the set of vehicles using indistinguishable pseudonyms
at any given point in time. Fig. 2.b shows how RHyTHM
could enhance user privacy: nodes with valid VPKI-provided
pseudonyms randomly and independently switch to utilizing
their self-certified pseudonyms to help other vehicles protect
their privacy. Thus, the anonymity set size of the two groups
is balanced. This does not harm the privacy of users from
the larger set since they change their set randomly for each
pseudonym update (it becomes clear next).
Assuming there are N vehicles equipped with VPKI-
provided pseudonyms and M vehicles run out of pseudonyms,
thus using their self-certified pseudonyms. The probability
of switching to self-certified pseudonyms is r. Using the
baseline scheme, the probability of linking two VPKI-provided
pseudonyms belonging to the same vehicle is 1
N
. However,
by using RHyTHM, the probability of linking two VPKI-
provided pseudonyms belonging to the same vehicle becomes
(1−r)
N−(r×N)
=
1
N
. If a vehicle with a VPKI-provided pseu-
donym decides to utilize its self-certified pseudonym in the
next pseudonym update, the probability of linking those two
pseudonyms becomes r
M+(r×N)
=
1
N+M
r
. Since 1
N+M
r
< 1
N
, if
M > 0, the probability of linking decreases, thus enhancing
user privacy. Thereby, employing RHyTHM does not com-
promise the privacy of users. If a vehicle decides to utilize its
self-certified pseudonym, the probability of linking decreases
at the cost of extra computation overhead. Simply put, by
switching back and forth between utilizing VPKI-provided
and self-certified pseudonyms, the probability of linking two
pseudonyms, belonging to the same vehicle, decreases exactly
because an adversary cannot know which anonymity set they
belong to. If a fraction of vehicles join RHyTHM, the prob-
ability of linking pseudonyms for those who always utilizes
their VPKI-provided pseudonyms increases exactly because an
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Fig. 3. (a) Comparing the probability of linking two pseudonyms using
baseline and RHyTHM schemes (N = 100, r = 0.2). (b) Probability of
linking two VPKI-provided pseudonyms (N = 100, r = 0.5).
adversary should link a VPKI-provided pseudonym to a VPKI-
provided one since the probability is higher (i.e., 1
N
> 1
N+M
r
).
Fig 3.a compares the probability of linking two pseudonyms
using the baseline and the RHyTHM schemes: by employing
RHyTHM, the probability of linking self-certified pseudonyms
of vehicles that must use it significantly decreases, becomes
0.05, when M = 1 and r = 0.2, i.e., 20 vehicles switch
to their self-certified pseudonyms. Moreover, the probability
of linking pseudonyms of vehicles that opt in to participate
in RHyTHM decreases slightly. When the majority of ve-
hicles run out of pseudonyms, vehicles are highly encour-
aged to switch to use their self-certified pseudonyms in
order to enhance their privacy. Vehicles with VPKI-provided
pseudonyms could simply ignore RHyTHM and always use
their pseudonyms. We define K (0 ≤ K ≤ N) as the number
of vehicles, equipped with VPKI-provided pseudonyms, but
never join the RHyTHM protocol. Fig. 3.b shows that the
probability of linking two VPKI-provided pseudonyms on
average, becomes:
Pr =
K
[K + (N −K)× (1− r)]2
+
N − r × (N −K)−K
[K + (N −K)× (1− r)]2
× (1− r)
The first term is the probability of linking two successive
pseudonyms belonging to a vehicle not using RHyTHM.
It is the probability of the pseudonym being in K set
( K
[K+(N−K)×(1−r)]
), multiplied by the probability of linking it
to its successive pseudonym ( 1
[K+(N−K)×(1−r)]
). The denomi-
nator is the size of the entire VPKI-provided pseudonym set.
The second term is for the rest of the vehicles using RHyTHM:
the probability of a pseudonym belonging to a vehicle using
RHyTHM ( N−(r)×(N−K)−K
[K+(N−K)×(1−r)]
), multiplied by the probability of
linking it to its successive pseudonym ( (1−r)
[K+(N−K)×(1−r)]
).
If K = 0, i.e., all the vehicles use RHyTHM, or K = N , i.e.,
the baseline scheme that vehicles with valid VPKI-provided
pseudonyms always use their pseudonyms, then the probability
of linking, on average, becomes: 1
N
. Fig. 3.b illustrates that
using RHyTHM increases the uncertainty as one cannot simply
predict the destination set after each pseudonym update. The
probability of linking two successive pseudonyms for vehicles
using RHyTHM is always less than the probability of linking
for vehicles always using their VPKI-provided pseudonyms.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We emulate a large neighborhood with 7 Nexcom boxes
(Dual-core 1.66 GHz, 1GB memory) from PRESERVE project
(www.preserve-project.eu) to evaluate the performance of our
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Fig. 4. (a) End-to-end latency to acquire 10 pseudonyms, averaged over
500 runs. (b) Processing overhead as a function of the neighborhood size
(τP = 30 sec, ratio of received messages: up to 60 beacon/sec, r = 0.5)
scheme. Our implementation is in C, and we use OpenSSL and
an implementation (github:IAIK/pairings in c) of short-group
signature [6] with security level of 112 bits for cryptographic
operations and primitives. The average signing and verification
latency for group signature is 56 ms and 82.5 ms, respectively;
thus, the extra computation overhead, when r = 0.2, for every
vehicle in the system is around 1.6 sec per τP .
Fig. 4.a shows the end-to-end latencies for obtaining 10
pseudonyms using the baseline and the RHyTHM schemes.
As the figure shows, employing RHyTHM results in 287 ms
extra overhead, mainly for generating the public/private key
pairs and signing them with the gsk, for the vehicles equipped
with valid VPKI-provided pseudonyms. This overhead pays
off as their privacy is improved compared to only using VPKI-
provided pseudonyms (beyond assisting vehicles in need). As
illustrated in Fig. 4.b, the total number of neighboring vehicles
that an OBU could face, if all the vehicles utilize their self-
certified and VPKI-provided pseudonyms, is 100 and 140,
respectively. By employing RHyTHM with r = 0.5, an OBU
could verify the signature of CAMs from one up to 120
neighbors.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented RHyTHM as a privacy-preserving scheme to
help vehicles operate and protect their privacy even if they
run out of pseudonyms. As future work, we plan to investigate
the provision of incentives for the vehicles to participants in
RHyTHM and the optimal probability of switching to utilizing
self-certified pseudonyms in different circumstances.
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